An account of the recent advance on Metz

-by MajGen P. de Chasteller, officer commanding, Blue Division

The recent and sudden outbreak of war caught me unawares, in the country. By the time I had reached Verdun my allotted column was already on the march and had reached Annanweiler, where I joined it. A second column at Gravelotte, perhaps three miles to the south, had been placed under my overall command with, I was intrigued to hear, LtGen de Trouville in immediate charge, a gentleman of whom I had only the most passing of acquaintances.

I issued general orders for LtGen de Trouville to advance quickly and directly towards the key fortress at Metz, using his numerous light horse to disperse enemy scouts and to maintain lines of communication between our two columns. I did neglect to specify whether Metz should be approached by the north or south bank of the Moselle, a source perhaps of some confusion and delay a little later. Fortunately LtGen de Trouville proved rich in initiative if a little lacking in communication skills.

As for my own column, I sent the dragoons off to protect my left flank along the northern road to Woippy via Saulny. The infantry and artillery were directed towards what I judged to be a key position in front of Metz, namely the old Vauban fort, now sadly dilapidated, at Plappeville. It transpired in due course that the enemy had indeed occupied this position, together with the small hamlet of Vigouelles to the north where they had installed a battalion. The intervening village of Lorry had, unaccountably, not been garrisoned.

I lost no time in detailing my artillery to bombard Fort Plappeville, with the object of pinning its defenders, while my lead infantry were sent forthwith into Lorry, which they occupied without incident. A personal reconnaissance then discovered the village of Tignomont, in rear of the fort, to be only lightly defended.

Detailing two battalions to watch both the enemy battalion at Vigouelles and some enemy cavalry who had been spotted to their north, I led the forward elements of the infantry towards Tignomont. This movement had the desired effect of causing the hurried evacuation of Fort Plappeville by the enemy. The Fort was promptly occupied by our own troops and guns, who now possessed a key position commanding the settlements of Lorry, Tignomont and Plappeville. I joined them to take advantage of the excellent prospects across the valley towards the hill of Devant les Ponts, where could be espied the main body of the enemy.

Now ensconced in the Fort, our cannon commenced lobbing shells into the remaining enemy positions in Tignomont and Plappeville. I saw an opportunity to turn the exposed flank of the enemy at Plappeville and dispatched what I suspected was a slightly optimistic message to LtGen de Trouville to send forces to that point. However de Trouville in fact proved most attentive to my orders throughout.

At this point I must mention the confusion now reigning amongst both enemy and ourselves as to the whereabouts of the respective sides, as a result of the swift advances our columns had made since dawn that day. It is a matter of interest [and may still be a matter of inquiry] as to how many messages LtGen de Trouville sent to me during the early hours of our operation. Certainly few if any got through; the couriers may have been taken by two squadrons of enemy horse who had evaded our hussars and who now lurked between the two columns in the village of Scy. We took in turn a number of their couriers in Tignomont, who had thought the village still friendly held. Unfortunately these messages did not bear the time of writing, and the handwriting of the enemy proved more devilish than their fire - these missives proved more of a handicap than a help.

It has to be said that the few early messages that made their way through to me from LtGen de Trouville were even more misleading. One, timed about 9.30am, stated “have dispersed enemy scouts; am in Metz. Artillery arrives by 10”. A glance at the map and a few swift calculations persuaded me that the fellow was merely being lazy: he was in Moulins les Metz, three miles west of the fort, but had not been bothered to write the name in full, leaving me the choice of the three places called Metz which were actually shown on my map!!! Clearly not in the pen-pusher mould, then.

Returning to the action, I was astonished to find that the help requested from LtGen de Trouville did indeed arrive in timely fashion at Plappeville, in the form of two squadrons of hussars, just at the point when the shell-battered enemy were retiring from Tignomont and Plappeville to join their main body on the hill. I sent in three battalions of infantry to complete their discomfiture, and sat back back to watch Trouville’s hussars cut up the routed enemy foot in a most sporting manner before they gained the safety of their comrades on the hilltop to the east. Here I commenced shelling them.

Our hussars then surprised me by disappearing from view without waiting for my further orders, somewhat to my ire at the time but I later found that they had spotted the enemy trains in the distance towards Metz and had galloped pell-mell after it.

At this point it should be related that our dragoons, having taken the northern route through Saulny, had in fact been badly worsted by the enemy somewhere east of that village. The enemy however had failed to press their advantage in that sector. An attack from the north could however be anticipated, and in fact was suggested by a captured but untimed despatch. I siezed the hamlet and wood of Vigouelles therefore until it became clear that this attack would not materialise. I have since been told that the enemy commander merely forgot about these troops, who received no further orders before the fall of Metz!!

I now felt that my column had advanced to the maximum extent possible consistent with prudence and my continuing ignorance of LtGen de Trouville’s whereabouts. An attack from the north threatened, and enemy horse were also in strength astride the Woippy road. Nevertheless my infantry in Tignomont and Plappeville was effectively confronting and pinning the main enemy body, affording LtGen de Trouville the opportunity of turning their southern flank and siezing Metz, our object, by a bold stroke. My messages spurred him on to this end.

A little later, no attack from the north had materialised, and the cavalry towards Woippy were seen to disperse. We had been shelling the enemy position at Devant les Ponts for some time, and the troops on the hill were now also seen to thin a little, perhaps in reponse to the shelling. I began to think in the offensive again, and of an assault on the hill.

My mind was decided when I at last received a most surprising and uplifting missive from LtGen de Trouville, revealing that his infantry had occupied the strategic fort on Mont St Quentin, as I had requested, and that his forward cavalry elements had in fact passed St Martin and had arrived near La Ronde, effectively in rear of the enemy position at Devant les Ponts. There was now an opportunity to catch the enemy as if in a vice and prevent their retreat back into the fortress of Metz.

Now dismounting, and taking sword in hand, I put myself at the head of my brave boys, and we rushed up the hill towards the quavering enemy. My brave boys took the position, but, alas, I could not be among them, since I stubbed my toe on a rock while ascending the hill, and could no longer stand on that foot. To my chagrin, I was bound to be a spectator only of the final hand to hand fighting.

The hill safely in our hands, I was carried to Maison Rouge, a nearby house of rest and recuperation, where the inhabitants displayed great imagination in treating my toe, and gave some attention also to other parts of my anatomy.

Later, while recuperating, I was regaled with the story of how my brave boys had marched, standards unfurled and bands playing, into Metz, and how the enemy commander, MarGraf Artur von Harman I believe, had confessed in the enemy newspapers to the “miserable failure” of his plan of defence. The debacle was blamed upon the necessity to defend against a large force of ours coming down from Luxembourg, which had of course never existed, save in the MarGraf’s mind. Apparently he had sent out scouts the night before the advance, who, nervous in the dark, had mistaken a flock of sheep for a regiment of dragoons.

I shall conclude my account by thanking LtGen de Trouville, and indeed the Gods of War, for their part in this, my finest hour.

De Chasteller